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THE GERMAN AND BRITISH ROOTS OF
AMERICAN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
SYSTEMS: WHEN IS AN "INTENTIONAL
ACT" "INTENTIONAL"? *
Michael L. Perlin**
INTRODUCTION

For nearly three quarters of a century, American courts have
declared that the basic purpose of workers' compensation law is
"to shoulder on industry the expense incident to the hazards of
industry; to lift from the public the burden to support those incapacitated by industry and to ultimately pass on to the consumers
of the products of industry such expense."' It has been universally acknowledged that workers' compensation legislation "is social insurance against a particular hazard of modern life,"' and a
form of strict liability insurance, 3 which evolved in response to
early case law, which had severely limited the ability of workers to
sue their employers for on-the-job injuries. 4
© 1985 Michael L. Perlin. All rights reserved.
A.B., Rutgers University; J.D., Columbia University Law School. Associate
Professor of Law, New York Law School. The author wishes to thank Verice Mason,
Esq., Assistant Deputy Public Advocate, New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate; Ms. Ruth Ann Wallach, Esq., New York Law School class of 1984; and Ms.
Francine A. Lee, Legal Secretary, for their assistance and support.
I Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 31, 16 So. 2d 342, 343
(1951) quoted in Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 18 N.J. 195, 197-98, 113 A.2d
513, 514 (1955). Such language tracks both the language of early United States
Supreme Court decisions, see, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418,
422-23 (1923); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 200-05 (1917), and of
early state court rulings. See Deeny v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., 36 N.J.L.J.
121 (C.P. Essex County 1913); Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H. 194, 197, 115
A. 449, 451-53 (1921).
*

**

2 Reisenfeld, Forty, Years of American JVorkmen "sCompensation, 35 MINN.

L. RE%'.

525, 529 (1951).
3 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 80, at 531 (4th ed. 1971).

4 See id. at 525-30. Historically, American workers' compensation statutes were
born of the dual heritage of German and British laws. See J. BOYD, A TREATISE ON

§ 8, at 16-17 (1913); S.
5 (1944); I
A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 4.00 to 5.30, at 23-40
(1978); R. LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY., 1900-1935, at 25-29
THE LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES TO WORKMEN

HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws

(1968); Gordon, Industrial Iinuries Insurance in Europe and the British Commonwealth

Before World War 11, in

OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY

191. 202

(1963) ("the British law of 1897 played almost as important a role in the history of

workmen's compensation legislation as the original German Act") (emphasis ad-
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Statutory schemes encompassing workers' compensation reflected certain specific compromises-while injured employees
were to receive immediate relief, thereby reducing the potential
for strife between management and labor,5 employees would in
turn surrender their right to sue employers for the employers'
negligent acts. 6 Indeed, in practice, such compensation laws are
normally thought of as substitutes for, rather than supplements
to, common law tort actions. 7
Traditionally, however, one of the exceptions to this so-called
"exclusivity ban" has been to allow a civil action in a case where
the defendant acted wilfully or maliciously,8 or where the tort was
an intentional act.9 Notwithstanding the existence of this exception, the leading treatise counsels a severely restrictive and formalistic view of an intentional act. In order to allow for
maintenance of a civil suit, the intentional injury must (allegedly)
be comparable to "an intentional left jab to the chin.' ' 0 While
early exclusivity-exception cases often did involve such assault
and battery claims,'' recent developments involve new workplace
ded); Reisenfeld, supra note 2, at 529, 536-39. Boyd is still cited as an authoritative
source. See, e.g., Otto v. Moak Chevrolet, Inc., 36 Or. App. 149, 152, 583 P.2d 594,
596 (1978) (citing Larsen v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 135 Or. 137, 295 P.
195 (1931)); Le Blanc v. Balon, 104 R.I. 99, 104, 242 A.2d 292, 294-95 (1968)
(citing Dazy v. Apponaug Co., 36 R.I. 81, 89 A. 160 (1914)).
Many early cases make note of this "dual heritage." See Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg.
Co., 80 N.H. 194, 196-97, 115 A. 449, 452 (1921); Wick v. Gunn, 66 Okl. 316, 318,
169 P. 1087, 1089 (1917); Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 63 Oki. 52, 54, 162 P. 938,
940 (1917); Lewis & Clark County v. Industrial Accident Bd., 52 Mont. 6, 10-11,
155 P. 268, 270 (1916); Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 590, 158 P.
256, 258-59 (1916). For a more recent reformulation, see Lindsey v. Hunt, 215
Tenn. 406, 421, 387 S.W. 2d 344, 345 (1965) (citing A. LARSON, supra, § 1.20).
Even where courts have suggested that a state's compensation statute was borrowed from British law, e.g., Hall v. Doremus, 114 N.J.L. 47, 53, 175 A. 369, 372
(Sup. Ct. 1934), it is clear that the development of German law was equally important in shaping state statutory policy. E.g., Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 34
N.J.L.J. 368, 374 (C.P. Essex County 1911) (discussing 1910 state legislative resolution authorizing Governor to appoint commission to study "employers' liability
acts of Great Britain, Germany and other countries"); see infra note 166.
5 1 W. SCHNEIDER, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 6 (2d ed. 1932).
6 See Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 439-40 (1952); see also Guse v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 408, 51 N.W. 2d 24, 25 (1952).
7 See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966).
8 See Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 471, 231 N.W. 233, 233-34, (1930);
Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 274 A.D. 690, 693-94, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 90, 9394 (1949); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 55-56, 9 S.E. 2d 35, 37
(1940).
9 MD. ANN. CODE. art. 101, § 44 (1957); accord OR. REV. STAT. § 656.156(2)
(1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (West. Cum. Supp. 1985).
10 2A A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 68.13, at 13-27.
1 1 See Merkel v. T.A. Gillespie Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1081, 1082, 162 A. 250, 250
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dangers such as asbestos poisoning. 2 These situations require
the apnew analytic approaches and an overall reconsideration of
3
accidents.'
industrial
to
rule
exclusivity
the
of
plicability
The policy question posed by this issue is, in many ways, a
microcosm of the development of workers' compensation law
and theory over the past century and a half. Any inquiry in this
area must reflect the unique character of the American workers'
(Sup. Ct. 1932); LePochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 298, 63 N.Y.S. 2d 313, 314
(Sup. Ct. 1946).
12 The hazards to workers from asbestos have been well documented. "Asbestos refers to a combination of mineral dusts found in a fibrous mineral material
known primarily for its strength and resistance to heat. It has been characterized as
'one of the most dangerous of all natural materials.' " Note, The Insurance Problem in
Asbestosis Litigation:A Casefor the Manifestation Theory, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 485, 487
n.13 (1983) (quoting Mehaffy, Asbestos Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341 (1980)).
Asbestos has been used commercially since 1874, and its production increased annually from 50 tons in 1877 to four million tons in 1967. Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55, 57-58 (1979). Exposure to
any commercial type of asbestos fiber has been found to cause significant health
hazards. Id. at 58 n.2 1. "Diseases associated with asbestos exposure include asbestosis, a non-malignant scarring of the lungs; lung cancer (bronchogenic carcinoma);
mesothelioma, a malignant tumor of the chest and lungs or of the abdomen; and
cancer of the gastrointestinal tract." Id. at 58. Between 1940 and 1979, 27.5 million people were exposed to asbestos while working in the United States, with approximately 8200 cancer deaths occurring annually among this population.
Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 871 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Asbestos Litigation]. Asbestosis-a pulmonary fibrosis-is frequently fatal, and some studies suggest that seven to ten percent of all workers
exposed to asbestos contract the disease. Id. at 873-74. Percentages set forth in the
studies vary, with some stating that all workers who are exposed to asbestos for
more than ten years will contract asbestosis. Id. at 874.
Of the estimated 650,000 victims of asbestosis and other occupational diseases
nationally, only five percent received workers' compensation benefits. Reutter,
Workmen's Compensation Doesn't Work or Compensate, 35 Bus. & Soc'v REV. 39 (1980).
See generally Comment, Workers' Compensation and the Asbestos Industry, 33 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1073 (1982). It is estimated that the amount of compensation received by the
five percent amounted to only one-eighth of their lost income; as one commentator
has concluded, "[wiorker's [clompensation for asbestos-related diseases is, in all
states, at best inadequate, at worst a travesty." Comment, Asbestos Litigation, supra, at
880.
13 Thus, following the lead of cases such as Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron
Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E. 2d 572 (1982) (failure to warn employees of workplace danger is "intentional tort"), and Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v.
Contra Costa Super. Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980), a
recent flurry of cases have attempted to refine the definition of "intentional act" in
such circumstances. See Pyle v. Dow Chem. Co., 728 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1984);
Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1984); Estep v.
Chemetals Corp., 580 F. Supp. 254 (N.D.W. Va. 1984); Parsons' v. Shoney's, Inc.,
580 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.W. Va. 1983); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F.
Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Teklinsky v. Ottawa Silica Corp., 583 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.
Mich. 1983).
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compensation system and must reconcile the competing social
forces and tensions that ultimately led to the system's creation.
As previously indicated, 1 4 the American system is an amalgam of the preexisting systems in Great Britain and Germany; to
understand fully the current scheme, it is necessary to (1) review
the specific social forces leading to the creation of systems in
those countries and elsewhere; (2) consider the political and economic climate at the time the American states adopted their first
workers' compensation statutes; 15 and (3) analyze subsequent
legal and social developments over the past 75 years. Such an
analysis will lead to an inescapable conclusion: there is nothing
in the history of the creation of the American systems, in subsequent social developments, or in case law to suggest that the
workers' compensation system robs plaintiffs of their right to
maintain a common law suit in response to an "intentional act."
Suggestions to the contrary' 6 reflect an inaccurate reading of
both case law and legislative history, and fly squarely in the face
of common sense and positive social policy.
I.

GERMAN HISTORY

Over a thousand years ago, the basic contours of modern
workers' compensation theory were firmly settled in primitive
Germanic law. Basically,' the master was liable for the wergeld of
the workman, should he lose his life while actively serving the
master, and also for an appropriate sum of money for a work related injury.' 7 This philosophy has been characterized by Larson
as perhaps "a more 'modern' social principle for taking care of
injured workmen than existed in the United States until the twentieth century."' 8 According to Wigmore, it probably stemmed
from a combination of Norse mythology and the Frisian
chronicles.'9
14
15

See supra note 4.
The 1911 NewJersey Act is, in many ways, paradigmatic of the "first genera-

tion" of American workers' compensation laws and will be discussed extensively
below. See R. CHANCE, THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT OF NEW JERSEY (1914); infra
notes 163-94 and accompanying text.
16 Cf.2A A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 68.13, at 13-27.

17 H.

BRUNNER, DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE

II, at 549 (1892) (translated in

Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 317 n.6
(1894)), cited in 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 4.10, at 23-24. See generally A. HIGGINS,
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION TO WORKMEN ON THE CONTINENT 32-45

(1898).
18 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, at 24.
19 Wigmore, supra note 17, at 319 (relying on Brunner, Ueber absichtsloseMissethat
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While there appears to be a large historical gap in the subsequent centuries,20 there is little doubt that an 1838 Prussian liability law-requiring railroad companies to provide
compensation to employees for industrial accidents 2 '-was the
first "modern" step in "the care of disabled workmen made necessary by the change in conditions brought about by modern in22
dustrial methods."
That law was followed by other enactments in 1845, 1849,
and 1854 encouraging the formation of workingmen's 23organizations to aid members disabled by sickness or accident. In spite
of those apparently prophylactic laws, however, it is generally
conceded that prior to the founding of the German Empire in
1871, an injured German workman rarely could secure adequate
compensation for his losses. 24 Even if legal action was successful,
damages were rarely awarded, so that injured workers and their
im altdeutschen Strafrecht, 35 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL PRUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (1890)). Professor Wigmore noted that: "[I]n the twelfth and thirteenth centuries . . . there can be no doubt on the evidence that there was a general
Germanic notion of responsibility for servants." Id. at 336 n.l.
The Norse myths are recognized as the root source of early Germanic law. See
J. WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 813-31 (Library ed.
1928). For a general anaylsis of the impact of the folk myths of German law, see A.
HIGGINS, supra note 17, at 8-12.
20 Larson's characterization of the period between 1000 and 1837 as "a colnplete blank," 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, at 24, is probably an overstatement; workmen's guilds for "the relief of disability" were recognized in Austria by Emperor
Ferdinand I as early as 1527, 1 TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, 1909: WORKMEN'S INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 33 (1911) [hereinafter cited as 24TH REPORT], and provisions for "the relief of
disabled miners, seamen, and domestic workers" predated the eighteenth century
in Germany. Id. at 977; see also A. HIGGINS, supra note 17, ch. 1.
21 See J. BOYD, supra note 4, § 15, at 26; L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, WORKINGMEN'S INSURANCE IN EUROPE 91-92 (1910); 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 983.
Prussia's lead was quickly followed by similar enactments of other German
states, including Holstein, Mecklenberg, and the Saxon duchies. See L. FRANKEL &
M. DAWSON, supra, at 92. The growth of the railroading industry in Prussia "made
possible the later Imperial Germany's meteoric industrial development." B. ARMSTRONG, INSURING THE ESSENTIALS 223 (1932).
22 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 977. For an historical analysis of the pertinent social forces at play in the German empire at this time, see T. HAMEROW, THE
SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION 1858-1871: IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS
(1969). For an early literature survey, see E. BORCHARD, GUIDE TO THE LAW AND
LEGAL LITERATURE OF GERMANY 121-35 (1912).
23 L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 92. The 1854 law has been characterized as "especially significant in that it compelled workers in certain trades to
join trade guilds and required employers to contribute half the cost of their management." Id. Subsequently, the states of Brunswick, Mecklenberg, and Saxony enacted legislation demanding that all employers belong to "some kind of mutual sick
association." J. BOYD, supra note 4, § 15, at 27.
'24 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 983.
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families were oft-times forced to seek public assistance.2 5
In an attempt to rectify the evils emanating from this freedom from liability, the Empire enacted a heralded employers' liability law in 187 1,26 which made an employer responsible where
workers were injured by an accident or through the negligence of his
to railroads, as well
agents or representatives. 2 7 That act applied
28
as to industrial and mining concerns.
Although the enactment was seen as a great advance, the intended benefits were not realized,2 9 resulting in a great deal of
bitterness and dissatisfaction on the part of the German workers." Consequently, lengthy Parliamentary debates were held
over a nine year period, centering on the need for ameliorative
in order to
legislation to provide for adequate compensation
"protect . . . the weak against the strong. 3 1
Id. For a full history of this period, see W. DAWSON, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN
1883-1911, ch. 1 (1912).
The significance of this issue in Germany at the time cannot be overstated.
Drawing on Zacher, and the report of the International Workingmen's Insurance
Congress of Vienna, 1905, and Rome, 1908, Henderson suggests that "workingmen['s] ... conscious[ness] of their wrongs. . .united [them] in a desperate effort to overthrow a government which seemed indifferent to their sufferings and
hostile to their aspirations." C. HENDERSON, INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1, 5 (1909).
26 J.BOYD, supra note 4, at 28.
27 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 983-84 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 984.
29 Id. at 983.
30 The law failed to be the expected palliative for many reasons: (1) lack of coverage of accidents caused by (a) the "inherent risks of modern methods of production," and (b) negligence of fellow workers; (2) failure to reallocate the burden of
proof (which remained on the worker), id.; (3) extreme delays in case settlement,J.
BovD, supra note 4, at 28; and (4) "inability of irresponsible employers to pay the
indemnity often compell[ing] the applicant to apply for public or private charity."
L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON supra note 21, at 93. Under the law, injured workmen
received compensation in only 10% of all ostensibly covered cases. Gordon, supra
note 4, at 193. This "reduced the rights given the worker by the Liability Law to a
nominal rather than actual remedy." B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 225.
31 J.BOYD, supra note 4, § 22, at 35 (quoting the Swiss socialist theoretician Jean
Charles Leonard Simonde de Sismondi).
According to John Graham Brooks, whose 1893 analysis of the German system
spurred the first legislative interest in the United States:
In the portentous mass of this insurance literature the thought is constantly expressed that the weaker members of society will be excluded
from all that accords with our usual sense ofjustice and fair dealing until
the centers of social influence, of which the first and most powerful is
the state, become imbued with the idea that a large proportion of the
misfortunes, sickness, accident, and premature age are social in origin
rather than individual; that a vast part of these evils spring, not from the
fault of the individual, but from sources over which the individual has
little or not control. ...
25

GERMANY,
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There were fierce political battles between, as Larson characterized them, the Marxian socialists and the practical socialists of
the school of Lassalle.3" Amidst that controversy, Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck submitted his first compulsory insurance measure to the Reichstag in 1881. 3 The plan mandated that all industrial employers, including mines, factories and other
enterprises, insure their workmen and other employees against
occupational accidents. 4 The insurance plan was to be administered by a government insurance corporation financed by both
employers and employees, and bolstered by governmental
subsidies.3 5
Although the bill failed at first, Emperor William I entered
the fray via his famous "Monument to the New Social Era" address to the Reichstag on November 17, 1881. In that speech the
Emperor made it clear that the German government was fully
committed to the provision of relief for those workers who were
disabled . 3 6 That address made it clear that the Emperor was going to back his Chancellor's vision without reservation.
Id. § 21, at 34 (quotingJ. BROOKS, FOURTH SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF LABOR: COMPULSORY INSURANCE IN GERMANY 19 (1893) [hereinafter cited as 4TH
REPORT]).
32 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 5.10, at 34. The Lassalle "school" drew on Fichte,
Hegel, and other philosophers specifically credited by Brooks for applying the following philosophy: the function of the state is "to be filled with Christian concern,
especially for the weaker members," J. BOYD, supra note 4, § 2 1, at 35, "with such
eloquent power. . .as to result in a distinct practical change of the state's attitude."
Id. at 34 (quoting 4TH REPORT, supra note 31).
33 L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 93.
34 Id.
35 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 988; see B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 22526.
36 L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 94.
Our efforts in this direction are certain of the approval of all the Federate Governments, and We confidently rely on the support of the Reichstag, without distinction of parties. In order to realize these views, a Bill
for the Insurance of Workmen against Industrial Accidents will first of
all be laid before you; after which a supplementary measure will be submitted, providing for a general organization of industrial Sick Relief Insurance. Likewise, those who are disabled in consequence of Old Age
or Invalidity possess a well-founded claim to more ample relief on the
part of the State than they have hitherto enjoyed. To devise the fittest
ways and means for making such provision, however difficult, is one of
the highest obligations of every community based on the moral principles of Christianity.
Message of Emperor William to the Reichstag (Nov. 17, 1881), quoted in L. FRANKEL
& M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 94. The translation in Frankel's and Dawson's work
is probably from DR. ZACHER, A GUIDE TO WORKMEN'S INSURANCE OF THE GERMAN
EMPIRE 3-4 (1904). SeeJ. BOYD, supra note 4, § 16, at 29 n.8a. Dawson's translation
is almost verbatim. W. DAWSON, supra note 25, at 16-17.
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A new, revised bill limited to accidents from the fourteenth
week of disability3 7 accompanied the Emperor's address. That
bill was in turn accompanied by an elaborate official government
report, which set out in detail the extent of economic distress due
to industrial injuries, and the public burden resulting therefrom.3 8 The bill, and the concomitant report, can be viewed to
this day as the foundation of virtually all prophylactic workers'
compensation legislation.
Any legislative reform that was bottomed on a perpetuation
of a proof-of-liability rule was doomed to fail, the report found,
as such a scheme "would not alter the fundamental difficulties of
the problem."' 39 The only viable alternative was in a system of
public accident insurance through which virtually 40all employment-related injuries would be found compensable.
For this purpose, the proposed system of public insurance
would include all accidents occurring in industrial establishments without regard to whether they were due to the negligence of the employer or his representative or to the negligence
busiof the injured workman, or to the risks inherent in the
4
ness without being the fault of any one in particular. '
With the enactment of such a compulsory insurance system, existing rules of liability would apply only to persons or industries that
were not included in the compulsory system; 4 2 "if, however, an accident was purposely caused by the employer or by a third party, the liability laws
would apply." 4 3
37 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 226.
38 Id.
39 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 987. The report made note of the significant
practical problems facing claimants who were forced to prove that the employer
had been negligent. See id. It further alluded to the possibility that the benefits of
the legislation might remain a "matter of chance," unless some solution was forthcoming. Id.
40

Id.

Id. (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 988.
43 Id. (emphasis added). In such court cases, apparently the employer would
have to indemnify the accident insurance association for any damages found up to
the amount of coverage. If the court award were greater than the insurance coverage, "the injured person would be entitled to the excess." Id.
The rule has been phrased another way: "Existing rules regulating employers'
liability . . . would also apply to employers convicted of causing an accident intentionally." Gordon, supra note 4, at 193. The use of the word "convicted" may be
somewhat deceptive. Criminal cases were traditionally under the jurisdiction of the
civil courts in Germany. See A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAw SYSTEM 86, 92 (1957)
(interpreting article 13 of the GERICHTSVERFASSUNGESETZ ("Law on the Constitution of the Courts")). See generally, 2 E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAw § 9.9, at 168
(2d ed. 1971); J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION 92, 101 (1969). Thus,
41
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Following receipt of the report and further legislative hearings,
the first comprehensive Accident Insurance Bill was enacted in July
1884, to be effective October 1885. 4 ' The bill, which applied only to
the mining and manufacturing industries,4 5 insured workmen
against all accidents occurring in the course of their employment,
which resulted in death or more than thirteen weeks of disability,
except for those injuries which were intentionally self-inflicted.4 6 It
was soon supplemented by a series of enactments, expanding coverage to inland transportation workers and certain government employees in 1885, agriculture and forestry in 1886, building trades
and navigation in 1887," 7 prisoners in 1900,48 and other public officials and soldiers in 1901."9
Those measures were revised and partially consolidated in
1900,50 and were amended again in 1909.51 Finally, the revisions
were incorporated into a relatively uniform system of administration, 5 2 and codified as Book III of the Insurance Code of 191 1."
That codification has been characterized by its first English translator 54 as "represent[ing] the experience of a quarter of a century in a
"when by a judgment of a criminal court it has been found that the [employer]...
caused the [employee's] accident intentionally.

. .

the injured party . . . can de-

mand from the enterpreneur the difference between his (private-law) claim for
compensation and his (public-law) claim for accident indemnity." 2 LABAND, DAS
STAATSRECHT DES DEUTSCHEN RETCHES 264-66 (2d ed. 1890), excerpted in A. VON
MEHREN, supra, at 427 (A. von Mehren trans.). For historical perspectives, see E.
BORCHARD, supra note 22, at 41-52; 1 E. COHN, supra, § 28, at 20-22; R. HUEBNER, A
HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW § 67, at 460, § 89, at 576-79 (1918); F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 29-34 (1950); R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE

LAW 245-48 (1959); Deak and Rheinstein, The Development of French and German Law,
24 GEO. L.J. 551 (1936).
44 W. DAWSON, supra note 25, at 18; L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at
95.
45 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 227.
46 Id. at 226.
47 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 992; B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 227.
48 W. DAWSON, supra note 25, at 18.
49 L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 2 1, at 95.
50 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 992; B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 228.
51 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 2 1, at 227. The 1909 amendments expanded coverage to all injuries involving the exposure of workmen to natural conditions (for
example, prostration from sunstroke), on the theory that "the dangers of daily life
become the risks of the undertaking through the fact that the workman is exposed
to them in consequence of his very service in the undertaking." Id. (citing INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE STUDIES AND REPORTS, SERIES M, No. 2, at 141 (1925)).
52 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 228.
53 Id. The German title of the Act is Reichsversicherungsordnung.W. DAWSON, supra
note 25, at 20.
54 The Code was translated by Henry J. Harris for the United States Bureau of
Labor within 60 days of its enactment. J. BOYD, supra note 4, § 595, at 1209. The
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system of compulsory insurance covering practically the whole industrial population of the German Empire." 5 5
The unified code extended coverage to employees of breweries,
fisheries, pharmacies, and other such establishments, and to workers
earning below 5000 marks (the prior limit had been 3000), and provided three classes of benefits: death, disability, and medical. 56 Employers were grouped, for insurance purposes, into mutual
associations known as Berufsgenossenschaften,57 which were subject to
the supervision of the Imperial Insurance Office. 5 8 The associations
were required to classify members as to risk, to fix premiums, and to
report all accidents to the General Accident Association. 5 9
Direct suits against employers were disallowed, except for situations where an employer was accused of intentionally causing an accident.60 The Insurance Code expressly provided that the employer
had to have "purposely" caused the accident; in such instances, the
employer's liability was limited to the amount by which the compensation award exceeded the accident insurance.6 '
This Code has been considered a great social advancement,6 2 in
that it assured injured workers that their families would not face
stark poverty because of an industrial accident.6 3 Twenty years after
the Code's enactment, a leading American scholar noted that the
German legislation exceeded similar efforts in the United States. 6'
entire act, The German Workmen's Insurance Code of 1911, is reprinted id. at
1227-500. For a summary of its key provisions, see id. § 108, at 223-26.
55 Id. at 1209-10 (quoting U.S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin No. 96 (Sept. 1911)).
56 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 228. Medical benefits were expanded to include prosthetic devices, and funeral benefits were included for the first time. Id. at
228-29.
57 W. DAWSON, supra note 25, at 106.
58 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 229.
59 Id. at 229-30.
60 Gordon, supra note 4, at 20; see alsoJ. BOYD, supra note 4, § 108, at 223 (injuries caused by "accident in the course of the employment" compensable "unless
caused intentionally"); W. DAWSON, supra note 25, at 111-12 (if accident willfully
caused by employer, he can be sued criminally under old liability law of 1871 and
obliged to pay indemnity fixed by that law less amount paid by his insurance association). Apparently the only exception to that doctrine was the case of an industrial
accident where "the cause is essentially connected with the establishment and the
act causing the injury is an outcome of the trade risk." 1 24TH REPORT, supra note
20, at 996.
61 The German Workmen's Insurance Code of 1911, art. 898, reprinted in J.

BOYD,

supra note 4, at 1368; see A.

VON MEHREN,

supra note 43, at 427.

B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 230 ("[The] German Accident Insurance Law
. was almost revolutionary in the social amelioration it achieved.").
63 Id. at 230-31.
64 Id. at 232. It is of special interest to note that the senior executive of the
62

Workmen's Accident Insurance Institute at this time was the author and philoso-
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Other Civil law countries followed closely on Germany's heels and
enacted similar statutes between 1887 and 1907, including Austria, 6" the Scandanavian countries, France, and other European
countries.66

More recent German enactments have perpetuated the same
approach. Under the German Accident Insurance (Reorganization)
Act of 1963,67 a comprehensive scheme was established to insure
benefits for employment accidents.6" That act delineates the full
range of cash awards and other benefits available to an injured
worker. 69 However, tort liability is preserved if the "owner of an
undertaking" willfully caused the accident 7° or if it were caused by
"a person working in the same establishment as a member of the
staff."-7 1 Although this liability had once been premised on the employer's prior conviction under the criminal statutes, 7 2 that requirement has been abandoned. 73
Germany allows the insurance compensation carrier to be reimbursed from a miscreant employer where the employer's injurycausing act is either intentional or "brought about . . . through
pher, Franz Kafka. See Pawel, The Centenary of a Contemporary, N.Y. Times, July 3,
1983, § 7 (Book Review), at 5.
65 "The country that modeled her system most closely after Germany's was the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose law became the basis for legislation . . . in ...
Czechoslovakia and Hungary .... ." Gordon, supra note 4, at 205-06; see also, B.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 234;J. BOYD, supra note 4, § 101, at 207 (intentionally
caused injuries excluded in Austria); L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at
115; 1 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 31-36.
66 See Gordon, supra note 4, at 206-07.
67 That act, hereinafter cited as RVO, is a recodification and update of the 1924
version of the Imperial Insurance Act of 1911, also known as The German Workmen's Insurance Code of 1911. See supra note 61. All citations to this Act are to the

English translation in

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, LEGISLATIVE SERIES

1963

(1965).
68 RVO, supra note 67, § 547. "Employment accident" is defined as "an accident sustained by an injured person during an activity covered by [other statutory
sections]." Id. § 548. Those sections, in turn, list the type of work covered, including, inter alia, that performed by "persons employed under a contract of private or
public employment." Id. § 539(1)1.
69 See, e.g., id. §§ 556-635.
70 Id. § 636.
71 Id. § 637 (1).
72 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
73 Fleming, Tort Liability for Work Injury, in 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 9, § 21 (0. Kahn-Freund ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Fleming I]. Fleming suggests that the exclusion covers only "deliberate injury, not
intentional violation of safety rules causing accident." See id. § 19 (citing to a Ger-

man language commentary,

LAUTERBACH,

REICHSVERSICHERUNGSORDNUNG

n.32 (1961), apparently not available in English translation).

§ 636,
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gross negligence." 7 4 Finally, a German employer can be penalized
financially by the governing body of the employers' mutual insurance association if he violates certain accident prevention regulations, either wilfully or through gross negligence.7 5
As previously noted,7 6 the impact of Germany's compensation
law on American legislation is beyond rational dispute.7 7 Indeed,
the Supreme Court of Utah recently noted that some states were
more than six decades behind the initial German advances. 7 s
II.

BRITISH HISTORY

The development of workers' compensation law in Great
Britain is less circuitous than that of its German counterpart. Its
path primarily reflects the major changes in economic and social
theory of the past century and a half, tracing the shift from laissez74 RVO, supra note 67, § 640(1). See generally Fleming I, supra note 73, § 34 &
n. 150; Fleming, Collateral Benefits, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 11, § 35 (A. Tunc ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Fleming II].
75 RVO, supra note 67, § 710(1). See generally Szubert, Safety and Health at Work, in
15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 7, § 229 (B. Hepple ed.
1983).
76 See supra note 4.
77 See, e.g., Lewis & Clark County v. Industrial Accident Bd., 52 Mont. 6, 10-11,
155 P. 268, 270 (1916). The court in Lewis & Clark stated:
Workingmen's insurance and compensation laws are the products
of the development of the social and economic idea that the industry
which has always borne the burden of depreciation and destruction of
the necessary machinery shall also bear the burden of repairing the efficiency of the human machines without which the industry itself could
not exist. The economic loss from vocational disease, industrial accident, invalidity, old age, and unemployment was a subject of serious
inquiry among the constituent German states before the days of the empire, but the credit for crystalizing the sentiment into workable laws will always
remain with Bismarck. From the enactment of the sick insurance statute in
Germany in 1883, and the fundamental law in 1884, the idea of compensation based only upon the risks of the business and the impairment of
earning efficiency spread to other European states, and finally penetrated to this country.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H. 194, 196-97, 115
A. 449, 452 (1921) (it began "in Germany in 1884"); In re Carroll v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 443, 113 N.E. 507, 509-10 (1916) (Seabury, J., dissenting)
("Legislation similar in character seems to have been first successfully applied in
Germany."); Wick v. Gunn, 66 Okl. 316, 318, 169 P. 1087, 1088 (1917) (stating "it
began in Germany").
78 Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 1975).
[Bly 1884 Gerinany had adopted the first modern compensation system,
and this was 13 years before England, 25 years before the first American
jurisdiction, and 65 years before the last American jurisdiction adopted
workmen's compensation plans.
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faire economics through the first recognition of the need for social reform, up to the ascendancy of comprehensive compensation systems.
The common wisdom is that the history of employers' liability laws in Great Britain starts in 1837;79 the prevalent social attitude at that time has been summarized by Dean Prosser, who has
noted that employees were forced to accept fully the hazards at80
tendant to their particular mode of employment.
Although the doctrine of respondeat superior was well established at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 8' Lord Abinger's decision in Priestley v. Fowler,8 2 which outlined the fellowservant exception to the general rule of master-servant liability83
served to reflect the general laissez-faire attitude that employees
had to bear the ultimate responsibility for their personal wellbeing.8 4 In addition to creation of that exception, labeled the
"fellow servant doctrine," Priestley was also read to create a second defense: that of assumption of risk,8 5 a doctrine soon ex79 See, e.g., W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 4-5 (1936);
MUNKMAN,
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW 3 (7th 1971). This assessment, however, may be somewhat overboard. Larson's characterization of the pre1837 period as a "complete blank" notwithstanding, A. LARSON, supra note 4,
§ 4.20, at 24, Wig-more points out that the English rule that "the master bore responsibility for his servant's doings" predated the sixteenth century. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts-Its History, 11, 7 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1894) (citing,
inter alia, Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y.B. 2 Hen. 4 f. 18, pl. 6 (1401)).
80 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 526.
The cornerstone of the common law edifice was the economic theory
that there was complete mobility of labor, that the supply of work was
unlimited, and that the workman was an entirely free agent, under no
compulsion to enter into the employment. He was expected therefore
to accept and take upon himself all of the usual risks of his trade, together with any unusual risks of which he had knowledge, and to relieve
his employer of any duty to protect him.
Id.
81 See W. DODD, supra note 79, at 4 n.4.
82 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
83 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 4.30, at 25. It has recently been suggested that
"the utter dearth of cases upon the subject indicates, clearer than any judicial opinion could proclaim, an ironclad rule of breathtaking simplicity: no employee could
ever recover from any employer for any workplace accident-period." Epstein, The
Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV.
775, 777 (1982) (emphasis in original).
84 J. MUNKMAN, supra note 79, at 3. Priestley was quickly followed in this country
in the "landmark case" of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.)
49, 57 (1842).
85 Larson characterizes Priestley's implications-" that the employee, being free to
do as he pleases, and voluntarily undergoing the dangerous conditions of his work,
[thus] has no standing to complain when injury does occur"--as being based on
"such phantasms as perfect liquidity of labor, perfect bargaining equality, and per-
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panded to vitiate liability for unusual and unforeseeable risks as
well. 86 Finally, the doctrine of contributory negligence-raised
first in Butterfield v. Forrester,87 and followed in a line of cases culminating in Davies v. Mann88-became an accepted avenue of exculpation within the confines of employment liability law. That
doctrine served to defeat recovery in cases where the employee
demonstrated any degree of negligence;8 9 its practical effect was
to render actions by employees virtually useless.9 °
It is no wonder that this trilogy of defenses has been called
the "unholy trinity, '"91 or the "three wicked sisters of the common law." 9 2 As indicated above, its interposition left the employee remediless in over 83% of all cases. 9 3 There can be little
dispute that the defenses had a devastating effect on injured
workers and the community.9 4 In short, the liability of employers
"under the influence of common-law doctrine, was interpreted to
mean exemptibility, rather than responsibility."9 5
Simultaneously, the impact of the industrial revolution on
Great Britain was monumental. The increase in the size and the
complexity of industrial and commercial enterprises brought
with it a corresponding increase in the number of industrial accidents and an inevitable increase in personal injury lawsuits. The
public became aware that the "wicked sisters" were "operating
too harshly on the claims of injured workers." 96 While several
American jurisdictions attempted to mitigate the severity of the
fect knowledge by workmen of employment risks and opportunities" and thus
"needling] no refutation in modern times." 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 4.30, at
26-27.
86 See Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 1858 Sess. Cas. 13 (H.L.).
87 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
88 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. D. 1842).
89 See, e.g., W. DODD, supra note 79, at 8; L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21,
at 42.
90 2 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 1499.
91 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 526-27.
92 Id. at 531. This characterization has lasted through the present day. See, e.g.,
Inland Mgf. Div., GMC v. Larson, 14 Ohio Misc. 129, 132, 232 N.E. 2d 657, 659-60
(C.P., Montgomery County 1967); In re McGarrah, 59 Or. App. 448, 455 n.6, 651
P.2d 153, 157 n.6 (1982) (quoting W. PROSSER,supra note 3, § 80, at 531).
93 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 4.30, at 27. Even this figure is too modest, for it
does not include all assumption of risk cases. Id. at 27-28. Armstrong suggests that
the doctrines, when read together, precluded the recovery of damages "in practically every case." B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 233. To recover, a plaintiff had
to show "unquestionable proof that the employer was directly responsible." L.
FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 42.
94 H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 21 (1954).
95 Id. (quoting E. BOWERS, IS IT SAFE TO WORK? 170 (1930)).
96 W. DODD, supra note 79, at 9.
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fellow-servant defense by adopting the so-called "vice principal"
rule, 97 that palliative was specifically rejected in England. 98 That
rejection became the focal point of dissatisfaction with the
"wicked sisters"--dissatisfaction which was not confined to those
employees most directly affected. 99 The dismay led directly to the
appointment of a House of Commons committee in 1877 to investigate the subject matter and the possible need for prophylactic legislation.10 0 The committee approved modifications in the
law, 1 0 ' and the first English Employers' Liability Act 10 2 was
passed in 1880, some three years later.
The 1880 Act modified the common law by elaborating on
the "vice principal" concept. A worker who suffered an injury
through the negligence of any person acting in the capacity of a
supervisor, 10 3 or any other person to whose orders the worker
had to comply, 10 4 was to have the same right to a cause of action
as an individual who was not working for that employer. 10 5 The
statute contained several constrictive provisions, however. A
person who had "superintendence" was defined in such terms
that only those who were primarily engaged as supervisors, and
who did not engage in manual labor, were covered. 10 6 Thus, if a
workman were injured by a fellow employee of the same rank, his
cause of action against the employer would fail. 10 7 In addition,
97 See Little Miami R.R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415 (1851). The Little Miami court
permitted recovery by a railway engineer against a railroad for injuries caused by
the conductor's negligence, on the theory that the conductor-who directed the
movement of the train-was a supervisory employee and thus acted as the alter ego
(or "vice principal") of the master, and for whose negligence the master was responsible. This doctrine was followed in several other states. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 3, at 529. The doctrine was expanded in NewJersey to include any employee,
of whatever rank, charged by a master with such common law duties as maintaining a
safe place to work. See, e.g., Smith v. Erie R.R., 67 N.J.L. 636, 644, 52 A. 634, 637
(1902).
98 Wilson v. Merry, 19 L.T.R. 30 (H.L. 1868).
99 W. DODD, supra note 79, at 11.
100 2 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 1500.
101 W. DODD, supra note 79, at 11 (citing 5 C. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw
OF MASTER AND SERVANT 5104 (2d ed. 1913)).
102 43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42.
103 Id. § 1(2).
104 Id. § 1(3).
105 Id. § 1. The bill provided that the workman "shall have the same right of
compensation and remedies against the employer as if the workman had not been a
workman of nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in his work." Id.
106 Id. § 8. A person who has "superintendence" was defined as "a person whose

sole or principal duty is that of superintendence, and who is not ordinarily engaged

inmanual labour." Id.
107 W. DODD, supra note 79, at 12.
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nothing in the statute spoke to the other defenses-assumption
of risk and contributory negligence; only the fellow servant doctrine was at all modified.
Although that enactment was criticized at the time of passage "as being of a revolutionary tendency,"' 1 8 the relief it provided was moderate at best,"0 9 primarily because it provided a
partial, unsatisfactory remedy.1 10 In fact, then-current empirical
evidence revealed that it provided coverage for only seven out of
every 100 injured workers.'
The failure of the 1880 Act inspired the proposal of several
ameliorative amendments over the next two decades, 1 2 leading
up to the ill-fated "Asquith bill," '" which would have abolished
the interposition of the three common law defenses in workers'
cases. 1 14 Most likely a result of the debate and controversy engendered by that bill, the time had come for omnibus legislation
in which "the principle of employers' liability was unconditionally accepted."' 5
Thus, the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 (1897
Act), 1 16 presented by Lord Salisbury" 7 and probably drafted by
Lord Chamberlain, provided for recovery so long as the injury
was the result of an "accident arising out of and in the course of
the employment."' 18 The bill's sponsors had cited two principles
in support of its passage. First, that a worker should be entitled
supra note 20, at 1500.
supra note 4, § 18, at 30; see C. HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 28.
110 J.MUNKMAN, supra note 79, at 14. Munkman suggests that the limited scope of
the Act reflected "the extreme nervousness of nineteenth century legislators in imposing burdens which, in their view, might have weakened the stability of industry."
Id.
Ill L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 42. The Act was also "undermined," W. DODD, supra note 79, at 13, by decisions such as Griffiths v. Earl of
Dudley, 9 Q.B.D. 357 (1882), wherein the court held that a worker-employer contract, in which the worker agreed not to claim compensation for injuries under the
Act, was not against public policy.
112 See B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 234; 2 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at
1500-01.
108 2 24TH REPORT,

109

J.BOYD,

So named for its champion, future Premier Herbert Henry Asquith.
The bill passed in the House of Commons, but was defeated in the House of
Lords. L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 42.
115 Id. The House of Commons report noted the inadequacy of the current legislation, primarily the high cost of litigation and inadequate coverage under its provisions. See REPORT OF THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 338 62d CONG., 2D SESS. 98 (1912) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT], quoted in W. Dodd, supra note 79, at 16-17.
116 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37.
117 L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 42.
113
114

118 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37, § 1(1).
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to reasonable compensation for every industrial accident, and
second, that such compensation should be considered as part
and parcel of the costs of production. " 9 Advocates of the legislation hoped that the measure would coerce employers into ex20
panding accident prevention programs. 1
Under the Act, liability no longer depended upon negligence
of the employer or his servants;' 2 1 rather, compensation became
payable automatically following an incapacitating accident arising
out of and in the course of employment. 1 22 A weekly payment
amounting to about half the workman's wages would be made
during the period of incapacity; 12 3 in case of death, a specific
lump sum payment would be made to the worker's dependents.' 24 The Act applied only to certain dangerous occupations,
including factory labor, mine and quarry activities, and
engineering. 2 5
Compensation would not be allowed if the injury in question
were caused by the willful misconduct of the employee. 1 26 Where
an injury was caused by either the personal negligence or willful
act of an employer or his agent, however, the Act expressly provided that nothing "shall affect any civil liability of the employer."' 127 In such instances, the workman had the option either
to accept compensation under the Act or to take the route available to him before its enactment.' 28 The worker was not, however, allowed to bring actions both under and independent of the
Act.' 29 This latter proviso is noted by the commentators 130 but is
not analyzed at any length, save the self-evident observation that
3
it left other avenues of redress open to the injured employee' '
and thus allowed the employee an attractive option 1 32 in such
cases.

133

119 W.
120 Id.

DODD,

supra note 79, at 17 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 115, at 99).

121 Cf.supra

notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37, § 1(1).
Id. sched. 1, § l(b).
Id. sched. 1, § 1(a)(i)-(iii).
Id. § 7.
126 Id. § 1(2)(c).
122
123
124
125
127

Id. § 1(2)(b).

128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See, e.g.,J. BOYD, supra note 4, § 575, at 1135; 2 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at
1503.
131 See 2 24TH REPORT, supra note 20, at 1503.
132 Epstein, supra note 83, at 799.
133 To the contrary, contemporary British courts gave varying interpretations to
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Nearly a decade later, a far broader piece of legislation was
enacted, the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906.134 That legislative initiative covered virtually all forms of employment, expanded the definition of "workman," added certain industrial
diseases to the compensable list,' 3 5 and generally added a degree
of clarity to the law while making its terms more favorable to
workmen. 3 6 Importantly, the provision retaining the right to
bring a civil action in the case of an injury caused by the personal
negligence or willful act of an employer 7 was retained verbatim.
Although the statutory scheme has been subjected to probative criticism, 138 there is no doubt that it had a significant impact
internationally. It strongly influenced legislation in the Australian states, New Zealand, the Southern African territories, Ireland, 3 9 the Canadian provinces, and elsewhere in the British
40
Commonwealth. 1
In similar fashion to the German legislation, the modern
British legislative endeavors have tended to reflect the tenor of
earlier enactments. For example, the Social Security Benefits Act
of 197541 provides that when a worker suffers an employment
related injury, he will be entitled to a certain sum in compensation."' Since 1948, however, it has been clear that an injured
the phrase willful. See Tennant v. Broxburn Oil Co., 1907 Sess. Cas. 581 (Scot.)
(willful signifies "moral blame"); Johnson v. Marshall, Sons & Co., 1906 A.C. 405
(H.L.) (wilful construed as deliberate misconduct); George v. Glasgow Coal Co.,
1909 A.C. 123 (Scot.) (wilful is "knowing the quality of the act").
134 6 Edw. 7, ch. 58.
135 J. BOYD, supra note 4, §§ 572-573, at 1131-34; 2 24TH REPORT, supra note 20,
at 1504-08; Gordon, supra note 4, at 203.
136 L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 43.
137 6 Edw. 7, ch. 58, § 1(2)(b).
138 See B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 236-39 (criticizing limited death and medical benefits, and inadequate arbitration provisions); L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON,
supra note 21, at 44 (insurance not compulsory); id. at 46 (compensation schedules
might encourage malingering by certain employees).
139 Gordon, supra note 4, at 206.
140 Id. at 207. For a compendium of all foreign statutes, see B. ARMSTRONG, supra
note 21, app. B, at 568-97, charts I-IV.
In many of these statutes, the exclusivity exception in cases of an employer's
wilful act was retained. See ILO STUDIES, supra note 51, at 53, 57 (Western Austl.;
identical to English Act); id. at 99, 101 (Cyprus; same); 2 24TH REPORT, supra note
20, at 2435-36 (Alberta, Canada; same); id. at 2473 (Cape of Good Hope; compensation scheme limited to cases of "accidental injury").
141 ch. 11.
142 Id. § 50. The Act expressly provides that, "[wihere an employed earner suffers personal injury. . . by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. . . there shall be payable to. . . him [specified] industrial injuries benefits."
This statute restates the general principles expressed in earlier, now-repealed, formulations, including the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1965, ch. 52,
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employee may elect to file a personal injuries damages action,
and that, if he or she is successful, there will be a deduction from
the amount of damages awarded of "one half of the value of any
rights which have accrued or probably will accrue to him therefrom [from] industrial injury benefits . . . for the five years be-

ginning with the time when the cause of action accrued."' 43 This
"cumulative benefits" system, which allows for subsequent tort
recovery reduced in part by the value of the compensation benefits, provides the worker with the fullest benefit of both systems,
in that the use of one in no way impairs his right to resort also to
the other. "'4
As to the burden on the judiciary of these additional tort actions, it is estimated that, under New Zealand's comparable statute, '4 5 only 0.9% of all reported industrial injuries result in
claims that are settled either on a tort basis or pursued to trial.' 46
It has been similarly suggested that some tort damages are recovered by not more than 10 1/2% of all industrial accident victims in
Great Britain. 4 7 The burden has thus proven to be a minimal
one.
Also, along with the German acts discussed previously, the
British laws served as the model for statutes in most American
jurisdictions,"' circumstances noted by American courts, which
have characterized the first state
acts as having been "borrowed"
from the 1906 British law." 9 In sum, the impact of the British law
the Workman's Compensation Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 58, and the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 84.
143 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act of 1948 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 41, § 2(1); see
J. CHARLESWORTH, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 1442, at 888 (6th ed. 1977). A full
explanation of the countervailing political forces that brought about the deduction
in question can be found in P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW
443-50 (3d ed. 1980). Other countries with similar sets of provisions include Ireland, see (Social Welfare (Occupational Injuries) Act of 1966, § 39, and Israel, National Insurance (Amendment No. 11) Law of 1965, 19 LSI 126 § 49.
144 See Fleming I, supra note 73, at 9-39 & 9-40. Fleming asks rhetorically, in
response to the argument that cumulative recovery as a result of tort actions might
have a "disruptive effect on industrial relations," whether "industrial harmony [is]
not liable to be undermined more by the denial of tort protection than promoted
by eliminating adversary proceedings?" Id. at 9-40.
145 See Workers' Compensation Act (1956), § 124, 16 N.Z. Stat. §§ 799, 880.
146 Fleming I, supra note 73, § 41 n. 179 (citing REPORT OF SELECT COMMIrrEE ON
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW ZEALAND § 134 (1970)).
147 p. ATIYAH, supra note 143, at 242.
148 SeeJ. BOYD, supra note 4, § 8, at 16-17; 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 4.50, at
30; W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 530; Epstein, supra note 83, at 787.
149 See, e.g., Bollinger v. Wagaraw Bldg. Supply Co., 122 N.J.L. 512, 519, 6 A.2d
396, 401 (1939) (English workers' compensation statute "identical with" New
Jersey's on question of meaning of accidental injury).
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on the compensation laws in the United States cannot be seriously disputed.
III.

EARLY AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS

Workmen's compensation legislation was promulgated in response to the tangible needs of American workers. 50 As in England, the use of the "unholy trinity"''5 of employer's defenses
alleviated the industrialists from bearing fiscal responsibility in
most cases.1 52 As a result, the loss of a wage earner through
death or disability left many families impoverished and thus reliant upon public and private charity.' 53 Although there were certain attempts to abolish the defenses, 5 4 it became apparent that
a system based on litigation and the need to show "fault" was
inherently inadequate. 155
It is agreed that the question of how an equitable system of
workers' compensation could be structured was first considered
in this country, in depth, with the publication of John Graham
Brooks's massive study.' 56 In a letter of transmittal accompanying Brooks's report, Commissioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright
told President Benjamin Harrison that the issue of "economic insecurity" was of the utmost importance. Commissioner Wright
noted the tremendous strides made by the German government,
57
characterizing their advances as both ethical and economical.
In his voluminous study, Brooks asserted that the principle of insurance was vital and complex; while applauding the German legislation, he simultaneously asserted that a simplistic adoption of
similar legislation might prove to be unwise."'5
15o See H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 94, at 17. "Workmen's compensation
was not invented; it evolved. It developed out of a series of social adjustments to

meet a social need." Id.
151

See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.

152 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 251.

153 Id. at 252.
154 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 530 ("Some slow progress toward the
imposition of liabiltiy upon the employer may be traced through the common law
cases.
...
).
155 Id. It had been estimated that over 80% of all work-related injuries traditionally went uncompensated. See J. BOYD, supra note 4, § 3, at 8; S. HOROWITZ, supra
note 4, at 3; 1 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 5, at 1.
156 See 4TH REPORT, supra note 31.
157 Id. at 9.
158 Id. at 286. After analyzing the German laws in depth, Brooks concluded:
The principle of insurance is distinctly ethical in its nature, and has
been so conceived by many of the ablest thinkers upon social affairs. It
assumes such redistribution of burdens and misfortunes as far more
nearly to satisfy our sense of social justice. The only question is the
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The publication of that report inspired a flurry of other governmental studies on liability and compensation issues in employer/employee relations,' 5 9 including a study and report by the
Commissioner of Labor of New York in 1900160 and an in depth
committee report to the Massachusetts Legislature in 1904.161
16 2
No legislative action, however, resulted from those studies.
IV.

THE NEW JERSEY EXPERIENCE

Following the passage of the first Federal employers liability
law in 1908,163 the legislatures of eleven states authorized the
creation of commissions to investigate employers' liability laws
and to study the differing compensation plans. 1 64 The preamble
to the New Jersey 16 5 legislative resolution stated the issue clearly,
particularly where it noted the general demand for modification
of the common law rules dealing with actions concerning employers and employees:
WHEREAS, The Governor in his Second Annual Message,
practical one. Can the state so manage this ethical principle as really to
help the weaker classes, or will the machinery prove so expensive that
the cost of living among such classes will not be lessened? An attempt
that we must pronounce magnificent is being made in Germany to reach
this difficult end. Especially in the sickness law, and to some extent in
the accident law, there are indications that important concrete results
have already been secured. It seems, however, to the writer, that no
mere material or strictly economic test can be applied to this legislation
without omitting what promises to be of greater value, viz., values that
are essentially moral and educational.
Id.
159 See, e.g., sources cited in B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 251-53; C. HENDER-

supra note 25, at 128, n.l. Armstrong further suggests that the "pressure
upon [available] relief funds," helped spur on this new governmental interest. B.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 21, at 252.
160 J.BOYD, supra note 4, § 8, at 17. The New York study is a full and comprehensive analysis of all foreign compensation laws, and their historical roots, and all
early American efforts toward creating a meaningful compensation system. See SEX'SON,

ENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK FOR THE YEAR 1899 (1900).
161 C. HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 139.
162 W. DODD, supra note 79, at 18. The new legislation was opposed vigorously
by commercial insurance companies, which issued "sweeping condemnations of
German social insurance, which had allegedly produced simulation and fraud . . .
combined with a decided lowering in the moral standards of the working classes."
R. LUBOVE, supra note 4, at 51; see also S. HOROWITZ,supra note 4, at 7.
163 Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 66 (1908) (current version at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)).
164 R. LuBOVE, supra note 4, at 53. The first Federal law has been characterized as
establishing the "worst [benefit scale for serious injury] ever known." Id.
165 See supra note 15.
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recommended that a commission be appointed to consider the
provisions of the employers' liability acts of Great Britain,
Germany and other foreign countries, and to report to the
next session of the Legislature a draft of an act with relation to
compensation for accidents to employes; and
WHEREAS, There appears to be a general demand for reasonable statutory regulation as to employes and the modification of certain common law rules applicable to suits between
employers and employes; and
WHEREAS, Both the employer and employe, as well as the
State, are interested in the determination of these important
questions. 66

Six months following the passage of this resolution, the members of the commission traveled to Chicago to attend the epochal
Conference of Commissioners on Compensation for Industrial Accidents.' 6 7 The Conference's work focused on thirteen propositions
relating to workmen's compensation.1 6 8 During the fifth session, the
commissioners debated issue number 12-to what extent common
law liabilities and remedies need be repealed in conjunction with the
passage of a model workers' compensation statute.' 69 That debate
sheds some light on a central issue of this article: was full exclusivity
J. Res. 2, 134th Leg., 1910 N.J. Laws 608, 608. The resolution authorized the
Governor to appoint representatives of labor and employers' interests and state
legislators to constitute a commission to make inquiry "into the subject matter recited in the preamble of this resolution, and generally as to the legal relations now
existing in this State between the employer and employe." Id. 1, at 609. It was
approved April 9, 1910. Id.
167 J. BOYD, supra note 4, § 9, at 17-20.
168 Id. § 10, at 20-21.
These included:
I. What employments shall the act cover?
2. Shall all injuries be covered, irrespective of negligence?
3. Shall all persons engaged in such employments be included?
4. Shall compensation be paid in a lump sum or in installments?
5. Amount and duration of compensation?
6. Length of waiting period?
7. Shall dependents include aliens and illegitimate relations?
8. Shall employees contribute?
9. Shall it be permissible for employers to substitute voluntary
schemes?
10. Method of determination of controversies?
11. Nature of scheme: Compensation, insurance, or State insurance, (a) Voluntary, (b) Compulsory?
12. Repeal of other laws?
13. Constitutionality?
Id.; see also PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONS ON COMPENSATION FOR
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 28-29 (A. Saunders ed. 1910) (held in Chicago, Ill., Nov.
10-12, 1910) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS PROCEEDINGS].
169 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 168, at 210.
166
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of remedy ever contemplated in the "first generation" of American
jurisdiction workers' compensation statutes?
In speaking on behalf of retaining common law remedies, James
Lowell, Chairman of the Massachusetts Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents, argued: "[I]f you leave your common
law, you will leave a chance of punishing the employer, if he really is
grossly careless in something that he should have been careful
about;' 170 "if you leave that in the law, you give a chance which, I
believe, ought to be left in to punish the employer, where he is
wilfully negligent."' 17 1 In response, session chairman H.V. Mercer, a
member of the Minnesota Employees' Compensation Commission,
suggested: "[I]f you leave [proof of fault] off of both sides [employee and employer], you will find that the insurance rate will regulate the employer better than any criminal law will do under these
circumstances, unless it be a case of wilful injury, which the criminal
law will take care of.' ' 172 Lowell replied: "To have compensation

that will cover everything [including gross negligence]. . . can't [be
done] without providing for a very much higher compensation in
such a case. .
1 73
sation law."'

.

than you can possibly bring into a general compen-

W.E. McEwen, another Minnesota delegate, picked up the
theme of criminal culpability: "I believe in just a single liability and
criminal punishment to the employer, who is wilfully negligent,
criminally negligent."' 174 Following extensive debate, the committee
approved the following resolution: "[I]f it is possible, the common
law, what we call employers' liability or statutory penalty laws,
would be suspended during the existence of a compensation law,
which means repeal if it is constitutional." 7 5 Immediately upon passage, James H. Boyd, Chairman of the Employers' Liability Commission of Ohio,' 7 6 offered some clarification: "We are not taking away
the proposition that the employer is to be penalized under the criminal law for malicious negligence;" 17 7 William B. Dickson, President
of the New Jersey Employers' Liability Commission and head of the
New Jersey delegation to the conference responded, "That goes
170

Id.

Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 217.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 227.
176 And the author ofJ. BOYD, supra note 4.
177 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 168, at 227.
171

172
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without saying." 178
Following the Conference, the New Jersey Commission members returned to hold additional public hearings. They drafted a
bill, which was submitted to the Legislature in January 1911 by outgoing Governor John Franklin Fort. 1 79 In his accompanying
message, Governor Fort stressed "not only the injustice but the absolute cruelty of the present rules of the common law with relation
to master and servant under existing business conditions."'

80

Soon

thereafter, in his inaugural address, Governor Woodrow Wilson
struck precisely the same chord. After noting the profound changes
in society which industrialization had wrought, the Governor noted
the need for a legal vehicle through which employees could obtain
their rights by direct operation of law, without resort to the judicial
system.1 8 The bill, which had been introduced inJanuary 16, 1911,
178

Id.

179 Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 34 N.J.L.J.

368, 374 (C.P. Essex County
1911).
The Commission's final report makes crystal clear that it was solely concerned
with a compensation scheme for industrial accidents, not intentional harms:
The members of the Commission are unanimous in their belief that
compensation to injured workmen is a legitimate charge against the cost
of manufacture,and that the victim of an industrial accident, or his dependents, should receive compensation, not as an act of grace on the part of
his employer, but as a matter ofjustice.
The burden of industrial accidents now falls in the most haphazard
and unscientific manner on the victim himself and his fellow dependents, the benevolent employer, and the sympathetic fellow-workmen,
or the public authoritie, or on all of these.
MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY 8-9 (Jan. 16, 1911) [hereinafter cited as
GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE] (transmitting to N.J. Legislature Report of the Commission
on Employers' Liability) (emphasis added).
180 GOVERNOR'S MESSAGE, supra note 179, quoted in Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel.
Co., 34 N.J.L.J. 368, 374-75 (C.P. Essex County 1911).
181 Inaugural address of Governor Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Sexton v. Newark
Dist. Tel. Co., 34 N.J.L.J. 368, 375 (C.P. Essex County), reprinted in 1911 SENATEJ.
60. The Governor stated:
We call these questions of employers' liability, questions of workingmen's compensation, but those terms do not suggest quite the whole
matter. There is something very new and very big and very complex
about these new relations and capital and labor. A new economic society has sprung up, and we must effect a new set of adjustments. We
must not pit power against weakness. The employer is generally in our
day, as I have said, not an individual, but a powerful group of individuals, and yet the workingman is still, under our existing law, an individual
when dealing with his employer, in case of accident, for example, or of
loss or of illness, as well as in every contractual relationship. We have a
workingmen's compensation act which will not put upon him the burden
of fighting powerful composite employers to obtain his rights, but will
give him his rights without suit, directly, and without contest, by automatic operation of law, as of a law of insurance. This is the first adjust-
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passed the Senate on March 15, 1911, and the Assembly on April 3,
the Employer's
1911.182 Upon enactment, the constitutionality 1of
83
Liability Act of 1911 was sustained immediately.
Within its historical context, the New Jersey statute is of significance for at least four reasons with respect to comparative law.
First, in similar fashion to its German and British antecedents, the
New Jersey enactment focused on industrial "accidents," not "inwas emphasized retentional" injuries.' 8 4 This purpose of the 1 Act
85
peatedly, subsequent to the Act's passage.
Second, the courts of New Jersey drew heavily from the experience of Great Britain, and derivatively from that of Germany, in
construing the scope of coverage under the workmen's compensation act. Thus, section 7 of the original Act tracked the language of
the British statute directly.' 8 6 As the language was identical to the
ment needed, because it affects the rights, the happiness, the lives and
fortunes of the largest number, and because it is the adjustment for
which justice cries loudest and with the most direct appeal, to our hearts
as well as to our consciences.
Id.
182 Id.; see 1911 N.J. Laws ch. 95. The Employers' Liability Act of 1911 is the
predecessor of New Jersey's current workers' compensation act, which is codified at
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 to -128 (West 1959 & Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).
183 See Huyett v. Pennsylvania R.R., 86 N.J.L. 683, 92 A. 58 (1914); Allen v. City
of Millville, 87 N.J.L. 356, 358-59, 95 A. 130, 131 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 88 N.J.L.
693, 96 A. 1101 (1916).
The act was construed liberally, as being remedial in nature. See Mayor of
Jersey City v. Borst, 90 N.J.L. 454, 456, 101 A. 1033, 1034 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
184 The 1911 statute made the adoption of the statute's compensation schedule
optional, as between the employer and the employee, as part of the contract of
employment. See 1911 N.J. Laws ch. 95, § II (codified as amended at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-7 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985)). If the employer elected the provisions of section I (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 to -6 (West
1959)), employees were required to take industrial accident cases to the common
law courts; however, the employer was denied the use of the three common law
obstacles, which usually denied recovery to employees: the defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine. See id. § I. Section
II, which covered all employers unless they had sought exemption in writing in the
employment contract, was the workmen's compensation scheme with a designated
schedule of payments for certain disabilities. See id. § II.
185

For example, in the

REPORT OF THE EMPLOYERS'

LIABILITY COMMISSION FOR

1914 (1915), the New Jersey Commissioner of Labor pointed out that
"primarily the object of workmen's compensation is accident prevention . . . [with]
the entire machinery of the compensation law tend[ing] toward the correction of
conditions which produce the injury it is designed to meet . . . ." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Thus, the original design of the Act was to address only the negligent
acts of an employer; all other employer actions were assumed to be outside the Act's
scope.
186 Employers Liability Act, 1911 N.J. Laws ch. 95. The Act set forth that "compensation for personal injuries to or for the death of such employe by accident
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British act, British cases were to be looked at in order to construe
the phrase in question. 1 7 Contemporaneously, the British courts
construed that section of the law as holding that an assault by an
employer upon an employee is not an "accident arising out of and in
the course of employment."'
Third, the original statute and succeeding versions reflect a
strong public policy concern that employers should be assessed "a
measure [of] the losses that naturally flow from accidents which befall
workmen in the course of their employment, rather than [allowing]
them [to] become objects of charity."' 8 9 In short, the New Jersey
statute fulfilled the anonymous campaign promise often attributed
to Lloyd George, that "the cost of the product should bear the
blood of the workman."' 9 0
Fourth, the original New Jersey act has been cited-both favorably and with disapproval-as a prototype for subsequent enactments by other jurisdictions.' 9 ' The act closely paralleled laws of
New York and Arizona, which were upheld in the face of constitutional attack in New York Central Railroad v. White' 9 2 and Arizona
arising out of and in the course of his employment shall be made by the employer
without regard to the negligence of the employer." Id. at § 11(7).
187 See Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N.J.L. 161, 165-68, 95 A. 1007, 1009-10
(1915); Bryant v. Fissell, 84 NJ.L. 72, passim, 86 A. 458, passim (Sup. Ct. 1913). For
the earliest generalized statement of this doctrine of interpretation, see Sears v.
Tindall, 15 N.J.L. 399 (Sup. Ct. 1836).
188 Blake v. Head, 106 L.T.R. 822 (C.A. 1912). This is consistent with the development of the case law in other jurisdictions. See Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn.
470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 274 A.D. 690,
87 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93-94 (1949) ("It would be abhorrent to our sense of justice to
hold that an employer may assault his employee and then compel the injured workman to accept the meager allowance provided by the Workmen's Compensation
Law"); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35, 37 (1940); see
also Epstein, supra note 83, at 814 ("Unlike ordinary negligence, intentional harms
introduce an element of moral hazard that is very difficult to control by a set of
rules designed for accidents."); Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of
Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1650 (1983) (courts deem
worker's compensation not "a license for employers to abuse employees").
189 See, e.g., Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 8 N.J. Super. 387, 390, 72 A.2d 802, 803
(Bergen County Ct. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.J. 341, 78 A.2d 709 (1951).
190 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 530.
191 Compare W. DODD, supra note 79, at 38-39 (lauding act for approaching complete coverage of all employments) with R. LuBOVE, supra note 4, at 58 (criticizing it
for "gross defects," including low benefit scales).
192 243 U.S. 188 (1916). The White court used the following language to explain
why the statute in question could pass constitutional muster:
[I]n our opinion, laws regulating the responsibility of employers for the
injury or death of employees, arising out of the employment, bear so
close a relation to the protection of the lives and safety of those concerned that they properly may be regarded as coming within the category of police regulations . ...
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Cooper Co. v. Hammer. 193
The New Jersey statute can thus be seen as coming squarely
within what historians have termed the "progressive" movement
and as having had the effect of ameliorating some of the most egregious abuses of industrialism.' 94 In this regard, it is a true outgrowth of its British sources, and reflects thefin de siecle social forces
that led to the need for remedial and protective legislation. In
neither the British nor the German scheme was workers' compensation the exclusive remedy in the case of an intentional tort on the
part of an employer; all of the evidence surrounding the passage of
the paradigmatic NewJersey statute indicates that such "exclusivity"
was never meant to bar recovery in an intentional tort case.

V.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

As the focus on industrial accidents has changed in recent
decades,' 9 5 states have amended their statutes to bring occupational diseases, caused by employers' negligent acts, within the
coverage of workers' compensation acts.' 9 6 Recent case law,
when analyzing such statutes, has attempted to reconcile the
traditional concerns of workers' compensation laws19 7 with the
complexities of the "new" occupational diseases. One of the critical issues, to be dealt with as part of this reconciliation attempt,
has been how to clarify the concept of "intentional tort" or "intentional act" in compensation statutes, where the action complained of did not involve an actual assault and battery, the
prerequisite suggested by Larson. 9 8
Thus, in the first significant decision rejecting the "exclusivity doctrine," the California Supreme Court permitted a tort action against an employer for the improper provision of medical
inspection and treatment after the original exposure to asbestos,
Id. at 207.
193 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
194 R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 240 (1955).

195 See supra note 12.
196 For example, New Jersey first included such diseases in 1924, see 1924 N.J.
Laws ch. 124, specifically adding asbestosis in 1944, see 1944 N.J. Laws ch. 88. A
contemporaneous legislative committee report articulates the understanding that
those amendments were limited to employers' negligent acts. See Legislative Committee REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, SESSION OF 1943, at 4 (1944)
(available at Seton Hall Law Review offices). Further, court decisions agreed that
actions based on negligence were given valid status by the act. See, e.g., Downing v.
Oxweld Acetylene, 112 N.J.L. 25, 30, 169 A. 709, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1933), afd, 113
N.J.L. 399, 174 A. 900 (1934).
197 See supra notes 4 & 11-13 and accompanying text.
198 See supra text accompanying note 10.

876

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:849

viewing this as deliberate and intentional conduct, aggravating
the original injury.' 9 9 The court defined the employer's deliberate conduct in terms that rendered the conclusion that the employer had acted unconscionably virtually inescapable.2 0 0 The
exclusivity is not undermined, the court reasoned, because it cannot be assumed that many employers will aggravate the effects of
an injury by deliberately concealing the injury and its connection
with the employment; in enacting a workers' compensation
scheme, the Legislature did not intend to shield "such flagrant
20
conduct from tort liability." '
The same conclusion has been reached in Ohio, where a
court was confronted with the issue of whether a common law
intentional tort action could be maintained against an employer
who had fraudulently withheld medical reports showing that the
employee had contracted an occupational disease. 2 There, the
court reasoned that the plaintiffs allegation did not describe an
injury "received or contracted by any employee in the course of
or arising out of his employment"; therefore, it held that the employer's fraudulent action would constitute an intentional tort.20 3
That doctrine was ultimately expanded in Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc. ,204 which held that no intentional
conduct committed by an employer came within the risks "incidental to employment," and that such intentional conduct therefore fell outside the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act.
199 Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Super. Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612
P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
200 Id. at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The court noted that
[the employer] . . .fraudulently concealed from [the employee], and
from doctors retained to treat him, as well as from the state, that he was
suffering from a disease caused by ingestion of asbestos, thereby
preventing him from receiving treatment for the disease and inducing

him to continue to work under hazardous conditions.
Id.
Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
Delamotte v. Midland Ross Corp., 64 Ohio App. 2d 159, 411 N.E. 2d 814
(1978).
203 Id. at 161-64, 411 N.E. 2d at 816-18.
204 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E. 2d 572 (1982). See generally Note, Blankenship v.
Cincinnati Milacron Chemical Co.: Workers' Compensation and the Intentional Tort, A
New Directionfor Ohio, 12 CAP. U.L. REv. 287 (1982); Note, Intentional Torts in the
Workplace-Further Evasion of the Worker's Compensation Act Exclusive Remedy Bar to Tort
Actions, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 355 (1983); Note, An Employee Is Not Precluded By the Ohio
Workers' Compensation Laws from Enforcing a Common Law Remedy for Intentional Torts
Committed By His Employer, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 682 (1982); Note, Blankenship v.
Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc.: Some Fairnessfor Ohio Workers and Some Uncertainty for Ohio Employers, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 403 (1983).
201

202
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The state supreme court thus ruled that a common law tort action could be maintained against an employer for his failure (1)
to correct noxious fumes in the work environment, (2) to warn
employees of the dangers existing in the workplace, and (3) to
provide medical examinations as required by law. 20 5 As there was
no express provision in the Ohio Act 20 6 discussing intentional
employer misconduct, the court reasoned that it could interpret
the Act in a liberal manner in accordance with the general purposes of workers' compensation schemes.2 °7
2 8
The trickle of litigation represented by these first cases
has grown, within the past several years, to a near torrent; primarily, the decisions reflect an idiosyncratic and nonhistorical approach to the problem at hand.2 9 While the reasoning of the
courts has often been ingenious and creative, 21 0 most of the post205 See id. at 612-16, 433 N.E.2d at 576-78. The court's ChiefJustice, in his concurring opinion, strongly expressed the basis for labelling such conduct an intentional tort:
I am troubled by the language in the dissenting opinions that workers who are intentionally chemically poisoned on-the-job should not be
able to recover damages from their employers because the elimination
of health risks would cost too much money, thus decreasing the profits
of corporations. I submit that anyone who believes that injuries or
death from gases, fumes, impure air or dust should not be eliminated
because a manufacturer will suffer a competitive disadvantage is an enemy of all workers. The dissenters' position is one that I would expect
to be championed by a 19th century "robber baron," not ajustice of this
court who is duty-bound to serve all the people of Ohio.
Id. at 616, 433 N.E.2d at 578 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring).
206 Ohio Workers' Compensation Act, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01-99
(Page 1980).
207 See Blankenship, 69 Ohio St.2d at 612-13, 433 N.E.2d at 576 (interpreting
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1980)).
208 See Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 379-80 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (employer's failure to follow expert consultant's advice on level of asbestos
exposure risks to employees reflected deliberate intent to injure); In re JohnsManville/Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229, 1233-34 (N.D. 11. 1981) (compensation law's "paramount interest is to avoid shielding from liability one who intends
to do harm") (quoting Collier v. Wagner, 81 111. 2d 229, 408 N.E. 2d 198 (1980));
McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714, 716 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(intentional exposure to asbestos hazards not type of employment risk contemplated by compensation statutes).
209 See Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coating Corp., 728 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1984);
Pyle v. Dow Chem. Co., 728 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1984); Gross v. Kenton Structural
and Ornamental Ironworks, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 390 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Mitchell v.
Shell Oil Co., 579 F. Supp. 1326 (D. Mont. 1984); Nedley v. Consolidation Coal
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1528 (N.D.W. Va. 1984); Estep v. Chemetals Corp., 580 F. Supp.
254 (N.D. W. Va. 1984); Teklinsky v. Ottawa Silica Corp., 583 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Parson's v. Shoney's Inc., 580 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.W. Va. 1983).
210 See, e.g., Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coating Corp., 728 F.2d 759, 760-61
(5th Cir. 1984) (citing Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 482 (La. 1981)) (relying
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Blankenship decisions have merely either calibrated the degree of
recklessness or wilfulness needed to make an act "intentional,"2 "' or considered whether the object of the "intent" is the
precipitating act or the actual harm.2" 2
While several of these cases reflect the modern legal trend of
focusing on the intentional actions of employers in failing to advise employees of the health risks posed by their work environment or failing to disclose information establishing that they had
contracted a life threatening disease through their exposure to
chemicals, none has considered the problem from an historical
perspective. While such cases are fully consistent with the original purposes and goals of workers' compensation acts, in that
they afford a separate remedy for employees forced to work
under hazardous conditions by employers who are fully aware of
the risks involved, they do not articulate the traditional and historic underpinnings of those purposes.
An examination of the German and British roots of the compensation system reveals that the law has reflected an unmistakable intent for almost 150 years: that workers should not be
deprived of the right to maintain a common law suit where an
injury was purposely caused by the employer. Although the type
of workplace accident has changed over the centuries, and
although the type of miscreant employer behavior may differ,
contemporary concerns continue to reflect the historical, social,
and economic forces that originally led to the creation of a workon RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A comment a, b (1965)); Teklinsky v. Ottawa Silica Corp., 583 F. Supp. 31, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (distinguishing employer's
concealment of workplace hazard causing compensable conditions from concealment of existence of physical condition after exposure, resulting in exacerbation of
condition).
211 Compare Mitchell v. Shell Oil Co., 579 F. Supp. 1326, 1329 (D. Mont. 1984)
(misconduct short of "genuine intentional act, however wanton, reckless or culpable" will not state claim) and Estep v. Chemetals Corp., 580 F. Supp. 254, 258 (N.D.
W. Va. 1984) (wilful, wanton, or reckless misconduct insufficient; conduct must be
undertaken "with knowledge that it created high risk of physical harm to employees") and Pyle v. Dow Chem. Co., 728 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1984) ("deliberate and willful disregard" insufficient to allow cause of action outside Arkansas's
workers' compensation scheme) with Parson's v. Shoney's Inc., 580 F. Supp. 129,
130 (S.D.W. Va. 1983) ("deliberate intent" subsumes injuries resulting from employer's "wilful, wanton and reckless" misconduct) and Gross v. Kenton Structural
and Ornamental Ironworks, 581 F. Supp. 390, 396 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (failure to
warn of "known danger" may amount to intentional tort even absent "actual intent
to injure").
212 Nedley v. Consolidation Coal Co., 578 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 n.5, 1533 ("actual knowledge" of exposure to "unreasonable, recognized risk of serious harm"
required; injury must be deliberately intended).
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ers' compensation system. 21 3 An expansive interpretation of "intentional act," for the purpose of escaping the "exclusivity bar,"
is consonant with this history and facilitates the fulfillment of the
"highest obligations of every community,"214 as proclaimed by
Emperor William I over a century ago.
213 See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 4.10, at 24. That section states:
But perhaps there is more here than the accidental byproduct of a
causation theory. We are told by sociologists that any settled society
eventually works out a conscious or unconscious solution of the problem of the disabled and helpless member; it may be a family system that
fills the need, or a clan or a feudal manor or a national state. In any
case, it is amazing to reflect that a thousand years ago-for whatever
reason-there may have been a more "modern" social principle for taking care of injured workmen than existed in the United States until the
twentieth century.
Id.
214 L. FRANKEL & M. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 94.

